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STATEMENT
Although the brief heretofore filed in the Net Proceeds Tax cases (United States Smelting Refining and
Mining Company vs. Phares Haynes, No. 6931 and
Combined Metals Reduction Company vs. Tooele County,
No. 6907) was designed to answer the arguments advanced by counsel in support of their petition for rehearing in the instant cases, in order to make the record
complete and assist the court in analyzing the matters
advanced by Respondents herein the following Brief is
submitted. Since the general problem has been presented
heretofore, we shall confine our remarks specifically to
answering the several arguments, upon which Respondents rely as requiring a rehearing in the instant matters.
Those arguments are presented to the Court in the Petition for Rehearing under seven separate points, which
we proceed to discuss in the order presented by Respondents.
ARG Ul\1EN11

I
The first alleged error consists of the Court's failure "to distinguish between premium payments made on
custom ores which had been sold and premium payments
made on ores produced but not sold.'' The fallacy of
this argument is twofold: First, it presupposes that premium payments were made on ores which were never
sold-which is not the fact. It is true, as set forth in
the Record, that premium payments in some instances
were made before sale and some times after sale, as a
2

matter of time. But in all cases there was a sale of the
ores in question. The stipulation reads as follows:

"19. In certain instances premium payments
are made in advance of a sale of ores or the metals
recovered from ores; in other instances such payments are made after sale of the ores." (R p.
54).
The affidavit executed by each mining company as
a basis for payment of the premiums provides that the
ore specified was ''produced and delivered for sale''
during the month in question. -While l\Ietals Reserve
Company was willing, based on the producer's affidavit,
to pay the premium in advance of the sale, it was not willing to pay for ore which never reached the processing or
reduction plant in the cycle which finally resulted in a
finished product for consumption.
Second, Counsel criticize the court for not distinguishing between custom ores and other ores, when there
is nothing in the record which justifies or permits a distinction to be made between these two methods of ore
production. All that is contained in the record is that
with respect to Kennecott Copper Corporation and the
United States Smelting Refining and l\Iining Company,
premium payments are made ''on the basis of the determined metal content of the precipitates an1l concentrates delivered to American Smelting and Refining Company" and "on the basis of monthly affidavits showing
the production according to the Company's records"
approximate!~, :--lO to 90 days hefore the orcs are sold;
whil1~ with independent or custom shippers, premium
3

payments are made at the end of the month in which
the ores are produced and sold to the smelter or reduction works. ( R. p. 54, 55). Since the only difference
or distinction as shown by the record is in the time of
payment of the premium (either prior or subsequent to
the actual sale), we do not see how the court would have
been justified in analyzing the two methods separately.
And certainly there is no distinction between the basis
for payment of the premiums on custom orcs and ores
produced and partially refined before sale.
At no time heretofore have counsel for Respondents
attempted to differentiate between the two methods of
production. They have at all times maintained that all of
the mining companies fall in the same category-the
joint trial, stipulation of facts, record on appeal, and the
briefs filed in connection therewith reflect that position.
Certainly, now is not the time to say that the Court
erred because it did not do what no one has argued should
be done-prior to the Petition for Rehearing.
On page 7 of their brief, Respondents argue that
''premium payments were made upon the basis of affidavits showing the production and delivery to a smelter
and not upon a sale, even in the case of custom ores.''
The same argument might be made with respect to many
business transactions today, where payment for goods
is made upon the basis of bills of lading, invoices, warehouse receipts or other evidences that certain goods have
been produced and appropriated to the usc of the Buyer.
Here the ores must have been produced and delivered to
4

the smelter or reduction works "for sale" as set forth
in the affidavit. In other words, delivered to the channels where the \V ar Allocations Boanl then had exclusive power to control the metal and determine its further
process either into shells, tanks, ships, guns, or other
materials essential to the war effort.
Again couniiel urge that because premium payments
arc based on the material paid for where settlement contracts exist, while fixed percentages are used where no
settlement contract exists (Brief page 6) the court was
in error in holding that "metals are not paid for under
settlement contracts unless such mdals are sold." The
court's remark quoted was limited to transactions \Yhere
settlement contracts did exist and merely illustrated that
in all such instances the ore had actually been sold and
the contract under which it was sold was use<l by the
government in determining the metal content of the
ore on which it paid the premium. However, the settlement contract itself may not have accurately reflected
the exact metal content of the ore sold any more than
the fixed percentages of 93, 90, and 85 percent of the
metal content in the case of copper, lead and r,inc respectively, used by the government where no settlement
contract existed. The indicated percentages merely took
the place of the percentages which were used in the
settlement contracts-and which might have differed
for each producer, depending upon its ability to command a favorable settlement contract with the smelter
or reduction works.
5

In all cases the premiums were paid for rnetals con-·
tained in the ore. That was what the government needed
to expedite the War effort. And in order to get more
metal each producer was guaranteed 17 cents per pound
for its copper, nine and one-fourth cents per pound for
its lead, and eleven cents per pound for its zinc over
and above the quota established for e.ach metal as to
each producer. This plan has been accurately described
as being a ''differential pricing technique.'' (See the
Senate Sub-Committee Preliminary Report as found in
the Appendix to the brief of Amici Curiae filed herein).
That designation alone is sufficient to justify this Court
in holding the premium payments to be a part of the price
received by the mining companies for their ore production.
However, the Federal Government further recognized the ''Premium Price Plan'' as an integral part
of its "pricing structure" when it adopted "Supplementary Regulation No. 4 to General l\laximum Price
Regulation-Exceptions." As therein contained" deliveries of metallic copper, lead, or zinc, or of ores or concentrates containing copper, lead or zinc * * * pursuant
to the premium price plan announced hy the Federal
Loan Agency, the \Var Production Board, and the Office
of Price Administration" were exempted from the Genoral l\laximum Price Regulation. In other worch;, the
Federal government recognized the right of each pmducer to receive more than the ceiling price for its ores
under the premium price plan. Appellants seek only to
re('1uire each producer to pay an occupation tax based
6
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on the "gross amount" it received source-from its ores.

from whatever

II
As their second ground for seeking a rehearing,
Respondents refer to parts of the stipulated facts where
the word ''production'' is used in connection with the
payment of premiums. For instance, it was stipulated
that the Tax Commission included the amounts received
by producers "as premiums on account of the production
of ores by said mining companies in excess of quotas
established." 'l'he '.vord "production" has been defined
by Webster to mean "That which is produced; a product." Let us insert that definition in lieu of the word
"production" in the several illustrations given by Respondents:
" (a) That the 'l'ax Commission:
'has included as part of the gross amount received for or the gross value of meta1liferous ores
sold during the year 1943, the amounts received
by said mining companies respectively from
Metals Reserve Company as premiums on account of that which is produced, the product of
ores by said mining companies in excess of quotas
established* * *.' " (R. P. 28).
"(b) .... 'premium payments shall he ma<le
for all tha1t U'hich is produced, the product, ovpr
quota in February and subse<lUent mont It:,;.' ''
(R. p. 37-38).
" (c) .... 'After quotas are estalllished, premium payments are made solely upon the basis of
that which is produced, the product, in excess of
allotted quofas.' " (R. p. 40).
7

" (d) . . . . 'Metals Reserve Company . . . .
has agreed .... to pay to the producers of said
metals . . . . the difference between the market
price of the respective metals and the equivalent
of seventeen cents (17c) per pound Connecticut
Yalley basis for copper, nine and one-fourth cents
(9I;!c) per pound New York basis for lead, and
eleven cents (11c) per pound FJast St. Louis basis
for zinc, as a premium for all that which is produced, the prodnct, of such metals in excess of
production quotas to be established. . . . ' " ( R.
p. 47).
Indeed, no other construction of ''production'' could
be used and accord with the over-all scheme used by
the government to obtain additional strategic metals with
which to prosecute the war. The very language quoted by
Respondents earlier in their brief from the case of Vitagraph Inc. v. American Theatre Co., 77 Utah 71, 2!)1 P.
303, indicates the danger of picking out a portion of
the stipulation as was clone above in an attempt to give
a different meaning to the "premium payment" program than is permissible in the light of all the announcements and transactions surrounding the program. 'This
court there held:
"In construing a contract the interpretation
must be upon the entire instrument and not mere]~·
on disjointed or particular parts of it. 'l'he \vhole
context is to be considered in ascertaining the intention of the parties even though the immediate
object of inquiry is the meaning of an isolated
clause."
Since Respondents refer to the concurring opmwn
8

of Mr .•Justice ·wolfe, we also wish to quote from that
opinion as follows:
"While in concept I think the whole can be
conceived of in law as the price the sale yields,
in final analysis I do not believe it makes much
difference whether the part which the smelters
pay is called a ceiling- price and the other a premium price or a subsidy. After all we should look
through terms to realities. As holds the main
opinion in reality the 'Amount of money . . . .
actually received by the owner .... from the sale
of all orcs or metals during the calender year .... '
was what those sales yielded and what they
yielded was what was received from the mills or
smelters or others to whom they were delivered
.plus ·what the Metals Reserve Company paid."
[n Promulgating the program of premium payments
the Government was not interested in ''effort'' or '' activity" except as it might result in more ore. Nor was
the Government interested in ore which remained on
the dump or at the mine. The metal was needed in war
materials. And the only way to get more metal \Vas to
pay more for it. As a result of being offered a tempting
price for additional ore the mining companies produced
more ore and made it available for the \Var effort. The
fact that "differential pricing technique" was used at
a great saving to the Government and thus to the taxpayer whose responsibility it is ultimately to pay the
hill, does not alter the fact that the "quid pro quo" for
the payment of the premiums was the actual metalsnot mine development, expora tion, or other mining enc1Pavors. True, the payment of premiums to the pro9

ducers enabled them to engage in greater activity to increase their output, just as a high market price has always been an incentive for a manufacturer or producer
to increase his output. Too, the amount paid by l\1 etals
Reserve Company was added to the amount otherwise
paid for the ore so that seventeen cents per pound was
received for the copper, nine and one-fourth cents per
pound for lead and eleven cents per pound for zinc on
such ores in excess of the quota established-which in
most instances was zero.
\Ve note that on page 10 of Respondents' brief, it
Is asserted that "in order to hold that premium payments were received on a sale," it was necessary for the
Court to find that there had been a sale or that the
ores were treated at a smelter or reduction works which
received ores from independent sources. The phrase '' received on a sale'' is nowhere used in the Statute, nor
does the Court use such terminology. What the court
did hold-which is in accord with the Statute-was that
"the 'premium prices' paid to the mining companies
arc for metals sold by them." As stated by Mr. Justiec
~Wolfe, "lt must be kept in mind that the tax imposed
in this case is not one on the sale of ore or metals but one
on the priuilege of mining." The amount of the tax is <lctermined by the gross amount received from the ort-s,
and the occasion or event upon which the tax accrues is
the sale or other application of sub-paragraphi:> (a), (b),
or (c) of Section 80-5-66, U.C.A. 1943.

In conclusion it il:l argued that to construe premium
10

payments as a part of the proceeds received from the
orcs would exade the provisions of the Maximum Price
Regulations, and would put the government in the position of engaging in blackmarketing, after having established maximum prices "with all the surrounding safeguards." Of course what we have heretofore said with
respect to Supplementary Regulation No. 4 which permitted this very procedure, disposes of this argument.

III
ln reaching its decision, this Court did not disregard the provisions of Sections 81-1-1, U.C.A. 194:1,
defining a "Contract to Sell." This section does not provide that the amount received must be paid by the immediate Buyer or that the "price" must he paid at the
time of sale. Therefore, the fact that premium payments
were made by 1\[etals Reserve Company and did not
coincide with the time that the ceiling price was paid by
the smelter does not violate the provisions of the Statute.
Nor do we agree with the statement contained on
page 1·1 of Respondents' brief to the effect that "it is
obvious that the premium payments received during the
calendar year 194i) were not in many instances received
i\'(Jlll ore produced in that year, and certainly not as a
result of Hales of ore.'' So far as the record reveals, and
as far as Appellants arc concerned, the premium paymentH reported by the several mining companies were
received foi· and charged to the ores sold during the
ea:cmlar year in question. vYhen the several Hespondents
, fi:e<l their statements, required by Section 80-3-67, U.
11

C. A. 1943, they failed to report the total amount received
for their ores, but reported only the amount received
from the smelter or other reduction or processing plant.
The Commission thereafter requested that each company report the premium payments received in connection with the sale of the ores already reported. This
was apparently done. As shown by the Hccord (pp. G:~
()4) the only difference between the amount of Occupation Tax reported and the amount assessed, is the inclusion of the metal premium payments. All of the figures were furnished by the producers so that they should
be in no position now to claim that there is a variance
from what has always been conceded to he the correct
assessment in the event that this Court should determine
that premium payments ·were properly a part of the
''gross amount received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ores sold."
Again, under Argument 3, Hespondents encleaYor to
argue that because premiums were paid "to increase
production" there could he no relationship between such
payments and the sale or disposal of the ores. The terms,
"sale," "price," "premium" and "production" arc
used indiscriminately in connection with the ''differential
pricing technique" used by the government to "a Yoid
profiteering and unwarranted price rises." The underl.ving purpose behind the program was to secure mm·c
of those strategic metals so vital to the \Var program,
without at the same time allowing the producer to profiteer at the expense of the government awl tho taxpayer.
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\Vhat we have h~retofore said adequately disposes of Respondents' argument No. 3.

IV
The statement contained under this heading is a
mere conclusion and not supported by the facts as they
appear from the Record. We feel no purpose would be
served in discussing this matter further, except as it is
answered by the other arguments contained herein.

v
As in the brief filed in support of the Petition for
Hehearing in the Net Proceeds Tax cases, 've find counsel attempting to influence the Court by the statement
raade by l\Ir. Henderson of Metals Reserve Company in
which he approves the Memorandum prepared by the
mining companies and submitted to him for such approval. But as the Record shows (P. 57) "Metals Heserve Company has made no study of the provisions of
the Utah laws relating to taxation of mines, and is not
in a position to express any opinion concerning statements in the Memorandum on that subject." Nor is the
commission ''bound by the facts, inference or conclusions therein stated." (R p. 56). As we have heretofore
pointed out, the Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case
of Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Salt Lake County
(not yet reported) determined that the question involved
"is essentially one of local law and therefore these deeisiOns (United States Smelting, Refining and l\fining
Co. v. Haynes, 176 Pac. (2d) 622, and Combined :Metals
13

Reduction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 176 P. (2d)
614) of the supreme court of the state are controlling."

VI
'l'he Court did not fail to follow the rules of statutory construction in reaching its decision in the instant
cases. We recognize, as did the Court and Mr. Justice
vVolfe, that there is "a good case" to be made for Hespondents' position. As yet Respondents have failed to
acknO\Yledge that "a good case" can be made for Appella~ts' position,-even though this Court has determined that the Commission was correct in making the
assessment complained of. We recognize and approve the
authorities cited by Respondents under their Argument
No. 6, particularly the language of this Court in the
case of Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170,
~l7 P. (2d) 937, 126 A.L.R 1318, as follows:
"'l'he duty of this court in construing and interpreting legislative acts is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature.'' (citing cases).
And again:
"~foreover, in seeking to give effect to the
intent of the legislature the court will adopt that
interpretation of a taxing statute which la~·s the
tax burden uniformly on all standing in the same
degree wtih relation to the tax adopted. In n'
Steehler's [1}state, 195 Cal. 386, 23:3 J>. !)72. An'l
1rill avoid an interpretation u.:hich 1could lead t:o an
impractical, 'unfair, or· unreasonable result. ln
re Parrott's gstate, supra." (Italics added.)

,

In the light of such persuasive language we
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are compelled to state that in reaching its decision
in the instant matters the Court followed the patern set forth above.

VII
For the first time Respondents seek to differentiate
between premiums received under ''A'' quotas and those
received under "B" and "C" quotas. At the risk of
being criticized by opposing counsel, we feel we should
advise the Court that in preparing the Stipulation of
Facts with counsel for one of the mining companies
having "B" and "C" quotas, one of counsel for Appellants asked if the company desired to include in the
stipulation any facts which would call the court's attention to such additional quotas on the theory that such
mining company would desire to make a further argument as to such quotas. However, counsel for the mining
company stated that in his opinion there was not sufficient difference to justify calling the court's attention
to the matter, and therefore the Stipulation was prepared and adopted on the theory that all premiums fell
into the same category.
An.] as a matter of fact, Metals Reserve Company
failed to make any distinction between the method of
payment, or basis for payment in the case of the additional premiums. They were paid on the ;)asis of a
fi.x·erl amount per pound for the metal. It only resulted
m a greater pricing differential with respect to the
metals involved. Instead of receiving a total of 11 cents
per pound for zinc, the producer, having a '' B'' or '' C ''
15

quota received an additional sum per pound for such
metal.
If the court will refer to the affidavit of the producer shown at p. 53 of the Record, as requested by
Counsel for Respondents, it will observe that the company therein indicated "produced and delivered for sale
during the month" mentioned to International Smelting
& Refining Co., a total of 510,305 pounds of copper on
every pound of which it received a total of 27 cents (including ceiling price and premiums), a total of 162,863
pounds of lead on cvc,ry pound of which it received a
total of 12 cents (including ceiling price and premiums),
and a total of 79, 975 pounds of zinc on every pound of
which it received a total of 16lf2 cents (including ceiling
price and premiums).
CONCLUSION
vVe respectfully submit that the Court's decision is,
sound and accords fully with the stipulated facts and
the record and that there is no reason for granting a
Rehearing for the purpose of re-arguing the same points
heretofore raised by the parties, considered by the Court,
and determined by its opinion rendered herein.
Respectfully submitted,
GRO\'ER A. GILES,
Attorney General of Utah
2AR E. HAYES,
Assistant Attorney General
ARTHUR H. NIE~LSEN,
Special Assistant Atto.rr~e,l} Gl'nrral
Attorneys for Appellants.
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